Nuclear Security Regulations (SOR/2000-209)

Regulations are current to 2019-08-15 and last amended on 2015-06-12. Previous Versions

PART 1Security of Certain Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (continued)

Requirements Concerning Protected, Inner and Vital Areas (continued)

[SOR/2010-108, s. 10(F)]

Entry of Land Vehicles into Protected Area

  •  (1) Every licensee shall ensure that vehicle portals are used for the entry and exit of land vehicles into and from a protected area.

  • (2) The gates of a vehicle portal shall not be open at the same time, except if required in the event of an emergency.

  • (3) No licensee shall permit a land vehicle to enter a protected area unless there is an operational requirement for it to be there.

  • (4) Every licensee shall implement physical protection measures necessary to reduce the risk of forced land vehicle penetration of a protected area.

  • SOR/2006-191, s. 12

Unobstructed Area Surrounding Protected Area

  •  (1) Every protected area shall be surrounded by an unobstructed area located on both sides of the barrier described in section 9 that extends at least 5 m away from every point of the barrier.

  • (2) The unobstructed area shall be

    • (a) free of any structure, equipment or other obstruction that could be used to penetrate or surmount the barrier or to restrict observation of the unobstructed area; and

    • (b) continuously and uniformly illuminated at an intensity sufficient to permit clear observation of any person within the unobstructed area.

  • (3) Paragraph (2)(a) does not apply to structures in place on the day on which section 9.1 of these Regulations comes into force provided that appropriate physical protection measures are taken to maintain the integrity of the barrier described in section 9.

  • SOR/2006-191, ss. 13, 40(F)
  • SOR/2010-108, s. 12(E)

Protected Area Intrusion Detection

 Every protected area shall be

  • (a) equipped with devices that

    • (i) employ two independent systems that detect intrusion into the protected area,

    • (ii) detect any tampering that may cause any of the devices referred to in subparagraph (i) or (iv) to malfunction or cease to function,

    • (iii) when an event referred to in subparagraph (i) or (ii) is detected, set off a continuous alarm signal that is both audible and visible in a security monitoring room and that can be stopped only by a nuclear security officer, and

    • (iv) facilitate an immediate assessment of the cause of the alarm; or

  • (b) kept under the direct visual surveillance of a nuclear security officer who is equipped with a device that can set off a continuous alarm signal that

    • (i) is both audible and visible in a security monitoring room, and

    • (ii) can be stopped only by a nuclear security officer from the security monitoring room.

  • SOR/2006-191, ss. 14, 39

Location of Inner Area

 Every inner area shall be located within a protected area.

Structure or Barrier Enclosing Inner Area

[SOR/2006-191, s. 40(F)]
  •  (1) Every inner area shall be totally enclosed by a structure or barrier that is designed and constructed to prevent, alone or in combination with other structures or barriers, persons from completing both of the following actions before an on-site nuclear response force can make an effective intervention:

    • (a) gaining unauthorized access to Category I nuclear material by using hand-held tools, weapons or explosive substances; and

    • (b) removing the nuclear material from the inner area.

  • (2) The structure or barrier that encloses an inner area shall be located at least 5 m away from every point of the barrier that encloses the protected area.

  • (3) Each gate, door, window or other means of entry or exit in the structure or barrier that encloses an inner area shall be kept closed and locked with a device that, from outside the structure or barrier, can only be unlocked by two persons authorized under section 18, using two different keys or combinations at the same time.

  • (4) No person authorized to enter an inner area under section 18 shall enter that area unless at least one other person authorized to enter the area enters and remains in the area at the same time.

  • (5) No licensee shall permit a land vehicle to enter an inner area except when there is an operational requirement for it to be there.

  • SOR/2006-191, s. 15

Inner Area Intrusion Detection

 Every inner area shall be

  • (a) equipped with devices that

    • (i) employ two independent systems that detect intrusion into, and unauthorized movement within and out of, the inner area,

    • (ii) detect any tampering that may cause any of the devices referred to in subparagraph (i) or (iv) to malfunction or cease to function,

    • (iii) when an event referred to in subparagraph (i) or (ii) is detected, set off two independent continuous alarm signals each of which is both audible and visible, one in the security monitoring room that can be stopped only from that room by a nuclear security officer, and the other in at least one other attended place outside the inner area that can be stopped only from that place by a person who is authorized to enter the inner area under section 18, and

    • (iv) facilitate an immediate assessment of the cause of an alarm; or

  • (b) kept under the direct visual surveillance of a nuclear security officer who is equipped with a device that can set off a continuous alarm signal that

    • (i) is both audible and visible in a security monitoring room and in at least one other attended place outside the inner area, and

    • (ii) can be stopped only by a nuclear security officer from the security monitoring room or by a person who is authorized to enter the inner area in accordance with section 18 from another attended place outside the inner area.

  • SOR/2006-191, ss. 16, 39

Vital Areas

 Every licensee shall identify all vital areas and implement physical protection measures — including access control and measures designed to delay unauthorized access — taking into account the design basis threat and any other credible threat identified by a threat and risk assessment.

  • SOR/2006-191, s. 17

Security Monitoring Room

  •  (1) Every licensee shall monitor from a security monitoring room, access to which is controlled by the licensee, the following:

    • (a) the protected area devices referred to in subparagraphs 11(a)(i) to (iv);

    • (b) the inner area devices referred to in subparagraphs 14(a)(i) to (iv); and

    • (c) those physical protection measures, implemented in accordance with section 14.1, that consist of devices that

      • (i) detect intrusion,

      • (ii) detect any tampering that may cause a device referred to in subparagraph (i) or (iv) to malfunction or cease to function,

      • (iii) set off an alarm when an event referred to in subparagraph (i) or (ii) is detected, and

      • (iv) facilitate the immediate assessment of the cause of the alarm.

  • (2) The security monitoring room shall be

    • (a) located outside any inner area;

    • (b) designed, constructed and situated so as to reduce vulnerability to damage and to resist forced entry by the use of hand-held tools, weapons, explosive substances or land vehicles until the on-site nuclear response force can make an effective intervention;

    • (c) equipped with

      • (i) a two-way radio that can be used to communicate with both the on-site nuclear response force and the off-site response force,

      • (ii) a device that can be used at any time to alert the off-site response force,

      • (iii) a telephone, and

      • (iv) equipment that permits direct communication with each nuclear security officer who is stationed outside the security monitoring room;

    • (d) located and equipped so as to enable a nuclear security officer inside the security monitoring room to receive and acknowledge the audible and visible alarm signals referred to in subparagraph 11(a)(iii), paragraph 11(b), subparagraph 14(a)(iii) and paragraph 14(b); and

    • (e) attended at all times by at least one nuclear security officer.

  • (3) A licensee shall monitor the alarm devices referred to in subparagraphs (1)(c)(iii), 11(a)(iii) and 14(a)(iii) using a primary alarm monitoring system and a backup system. The backup system shall maintain the operation of the alarm monitoring function, including key computer systems, in the event of a failure of equipment essential to the functioning of the primary system.

  • SOR/2006-191, ss. 18, 39
 
Date modified: