Nuclear Security Regulations (SOR/2000-209)

Regulations are current to 2019-08-28 and last amended on 2015-06-12. Previous Versions

Nuclear Security Regulations

SOR/2000-209

NUCLEAR SAFETY AND CONTROL ACT

Registration 2000-05-31

Nuclear Security Regulations

P.C. 2000-789  2000-05-31

Her Excellency the Governor General in Council, on the recommendation of the Minister of Natural Resources, pursuant to section 44 of the Nuclear Safety and Control ActFootnote a, hereby approves the annexed Nuclear Security Regulations made by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission on May 31, 2000.

Interpretation

[SOR/2006-191, s. 1]

 The definitions in this section apply in these Regulations.

Act

Act means the Nuclear Safety and Control Act. (Loi)

Category I nuclear material

Category I nuclear material means a nuclear substance listed in column 1 of Schedule 1 that is in the corresponding form set out in column 2 and the corresponding quantity set out in column 3 of Schedule 1. (matière nucléaire de catégorie I)

Category II nuclear material

Category II nuclear material means a nuclear substance listed in column 1 of Schedule 1 that is in the corresponding form set out in column 2 and the corresponding quantity set out in column 4 of Schedule 1. (matière nucléaire de catégorie II)

Category III nuclear material

Category III nuclear material means a nuclear substance listed in column 1 of Schedule 1 that is in the corresponding form set out in column 2 and the corresponding quantity set out in column 5 of Schedule 1. (matière nucléaire de catégorie III)

design basis threat

design basis threat means the characteristics of a potential adversary in respect of which countermeasures are incorporated into the design and evaluation of a physical protection system. (menace de référence)

direct visual surveillance

direct visual surveillance means direct observation by a person who is physically present at the place that is under observation. (surveillance visuelle directe)

effective intervention

effective intervention means an intervention that is timely and powerful enough to prevent a person or group of persons, including those equipped with weapons or explosive substances, from committing sabotage or from removing Category I, II or III nuclear material otherwise than in accordance with a licence. (défense efficace)

explosive substance

explosive substance includes

  • (a) anything intended to be used to make a substance capable of producing an explosion, a detonation or a pyrotechnic effect;

  • (b) anything, or any part of any thing, used or intended to be used or adapted to cause, or to aid in causing, an explosion in or with a substance referred to in paragraph (a); and

  • (c) an incendiary grenade, firebomb, Molotov cocktail or other similar incendiary substance or device and a delaying mechanism or other thing intended for use in connection with such a substance or device. (substance explosive)

high-security site

high-security site means a nuclear power plant or a nuclear facility where Category I or II nuclear material is processed, used or stored. (site à sécurité élevée)

inner area

inner area means an area inside a protected area that is surrounded by a barrier or structure that meets the requirements of section 13. (zone intérieure)

licensee

licensee means

  • (a) in this section and sections 2 to 7.2, a person who is licensed to carry on an activity described in any of paragraphs 26(a), (b), (e) or (f) of the Act in relation to Category I, II or III nuclear material or a nuclear power plant;

  • (b) in sections 7.3 to 38, a person who is licensed to carry on an activity described in any of paragraphs 26(a), (b), (e) or (f) of the Act in relation to a high-security site; and

  • (c) in Part 2, a person who is licensed to carry on an activity described in any of paragraphs 26(a), (b) or (e) of the Act in relation to a nuclear facility set out in column 2 of Schedule 2. (titulaire de permis)

nuclear power plant

nuclear power plant means a nuclear facility consisting of any fission-reactor installation that has been constructed to generate electricity on a commercial scale. (centrale nucléaire)

nuclear security guard

nuclear security guard[Repealed, SOR/2006-191, s. 2]

nuclear security officer

nuclear security officer means a person whose function is to provide security at a high-security site and to whom an authorization referred to in subsection 18(2) has been issued. (agent de sécurité nucléaire)

off-site response force

off-site response force means a local, provincial or federal police service whose members are not located at a nuclear facility. (force d’intervention externe)

on-site nuclear response force

on-site nuclear response force means

  • (a) a team of nuclear security officers whose members are

    • (i) trained in the use of firearms, authorized to carry firearms in Canada and qualified to use them, and

    • (ii) permanently located at a high-security site; or

  • (b) a local, provincial or federal police service, a Canadian Forces unit or any other force

    • (i) under contract to a licensee,

    • (ii) whose members are trained in the use of firearms, authorized to carry firearms in Canada and qualified to use them, and

    • (iii) whose members are permanently located at a high-security site. (force d’intervention nucléaire interne)

Personnel Security Standard

Personnel Security Standard means the document entitled Chapter 2 — 4 — Personnel Security Standard, published by the Treasury Board Secretariat and dated June 9, 1994, as amended from time to time. (Norme sur la sécurité du personnel)

physical protection measure

physical protection measure means an element or a combination of elements in place at a nuclear facility for its protection — or for the protection of nuclear substances at the facility — against potential adversaries. (mesure de protection physique)

physical protection system

physical protection system means all of the physical protection measures in place at a nuclear facility. (système de protection physique)

physical protection system support person

physical protection system support person means a person who

  • (a) carries out the design, implementation, maintenance or repair of a physical protection system at a high-security site or conducts training related to one or more of those activities; and

  • (b) could have access to prescribed information in carrying out the activities referred to in paragraph (a). (préposé au système de protection physique)

potential adversary

potential adversary means any person — whether or not they have authorized access to a nuclear facility — who might attempt

  • (a) the unauthorized removal of Category I, II or III nuclear material; or

  • (b) sabotage. (agresseur potentiel)

prescribed information

prescribed information means the information prescribed by section 21 of the General Nuclear Safety and Control Regulations. (renseignements réglementés)

protected area

protected area means an area that is surrounded by a barrier that meets the requirements of section 9. (zone protégée)

response force

response force[Repealed, SOR/2006-191, s. 2]

sabotage

sabotage means any deliberate act or omission, directed against a nuclear facility or nuclear substances, that

  • (a) endangers or could endanger the health or safety of any person; or

  • (b) results or could result in contamination of the environment. (sabotage)

security monitoring room

security monitoring room means a security monitoring room referred to in section 15. (local de surveillance)

threat and risk assessment

threat and risk assessment means an evaluation of the adequacy of an existing or a proposed physical protection system designed to safeguard against

  • (a) intentional acts that could pose a threat to the security of a high-security site; and

  • (b) the exploitation of weaknesses in the physical protection measures of a high-security site. (évaluation de la menace et du risque)

unobstructed area

unobstructed area[Repealed, SOR/2006-191, s. 2]

vehicle portal

vehicle portal means a structure situated on the perimeter of a protected area that is enclosed on the sides and consists of two movable gates, separated by a space sufficiently large to accommodate land vehicles having an operational requirement to enter the area. (sas pour véhicule)

vital area

vital area means an area inside a protected area containing equipment, systems, devices or a nuclear substance, whose sabotage could pose an unreasonable risk to the environment or to the health or safety of persons arising from exposure to radiation. (zone vitale)

weapon

weapon means anything that could be used or is capable of being used to jeopardize the security of a nuclear facility or a nuclear substance or anything, including firearms, that is used, designed to be used or intended for use in causing death or injury to any person or for the purpose of threatening or intimidating any person. (arme)

  • SOR/2006-191, ss. 2, 38
  • SOR/2010-108, s. 9(F)
  • SOR/2015-67, s. 5

PART 1Security of Certain Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities

Application

[SOR/2006-191, s. 3]

 This Part applies in respect of

  • (a) Category I, II and III nuclear material; and

  • (b) a nuclear power plant.

  • SOR/2006-191, s. 4

Licence Applications

Licence in Respect of Category I or II Nuclear Material or a Nuclear Facility

 An application for a licence in respect of Category I or II nuclear material, other than a licence to transport, and an application for a licence in respect of a nuclear facility referred to in paragraph 2(b) shall contain the following information in addition to the information required by section 3 of the Nuclear Substances and Radiation Devices Regulations or sections 3 to 8 of the Class I Nuclear Facilities Regulations, as applicable:

  • (a) a copy of the arrangements referred to in section 35;

  • (b) the site plan referred to in section 16;

  • (c) a description of the proposed security equipment, systems and procedures;

  • (d) a description of the proposed on-site and off-site communications equipment, systems and procedures;

  • (e) a description of the proposed structure and organization of the nuclear security officer service, including the duties, responsibilities and training of nuclear security officers;

  • (f) the proposed plan and procedures to assess and respond to breaches of security; and

  • (g) the current threat and risk assessment.

  • SOR/2006-191, ss. 5, 39

Licence in Respect of Category III Nuclear Material

 An application for a licence in respect of Category III nuclear material, other than a licence to transport, shall contain, in addition to the information required by section 3 of the Nuclear Substances and Radiation Devices Regulations, a description of the measures to be taken to ensure compliance with subsection 7(3) and sections 7.1 and 7.2.

  • SOR/2006-191, s. 6

Licence to Transport Category I, II or III Nuclear Material

 An application for a licence to transport Category I, II or III nuclear material shall contain, in addition to any other information required by section 7 of the Packaging and Transport of Nuclear Substances Regulations, 2015, a written transportation security plan that includes

  • (a) the name, quantity, radiation level in Gy/h, chemical and physical characteristics and isotopic composition of the nuclear material;

  • (b) a threat assessment consisting of an evaluation of the nature, likelihood and consequences of acts or events that may place prescribed information or nuclear material at risk;

  • (c) a description of the conveyance;

  • (d) the proposed security measures;

  • (e) the communication arrangements made among the licensee, the operator of the land vehicle transporting the nuclear material, the recipient of the material and any off-site response force along the route;

  • (f) the arrangements made between the licensee and any off-site response force along the route;

  • (g) the planned route; and

  • (h) the alternate route to be used in case of an emergency.

  • SOR/2006-191, s. 7
  • SOR/2015-145, s. 47

Exemption From Licence Requirement

  •  (1) A person may, without a licence to carry on that activity, transport Category I, II or III nuclear material within an area in which the material is required by section 7 to be processed, used or stored.

  • (2) For greater certainty, the exemption established in subsection (1) relates only to the activity specified in that subsection and does not derogate from the licence requirement imposed by section 26 of the Act in relation to other activities.

General Obligations Relating to Category I, II or III Nuclear Material

[SOR/2006-191, s. 8]

Areas for Processing, Use and Storage of Category I, II or III Nuclear Material

  •  (1) Every licensee shall process, use and store Category I nuclear material in an inner area.

  • (2) Every licensee shall process, use and store Category II nuclear material in a protected area.

  • (3) Every licensee shall process, use and store Category III nuclear material in

    • (a) a protected area;

    • (b) an area that is under the direct visual surveillance of the licensee; or

    • (c) an area to which access is controlled by the licensee and that is designed and constructed to prevent persons from gaining unauthorized access to the Category III nuclear material by using hand-held tools.

  • SOR/2006-191, s. 9

Requirements Concerning Category III Nuclear Material

  •  (1) Subject to subsection (2), if a licensee processes, uses or stores Category III nuclear material in an area referred to in paragraph 7(3)(c), the licensee shall ensure that the area is equipped with devices that

    • (a) detect any intrusion into it;

    • (b) detect any unauthorized removal of Category III nuclear material;

    • (c) detect any tampering that may cause any of the devices to malfunction or cease to function; and

    • (d) when an event referred to in paragraph (a), (b) or (c) is detected, set off a continuous alarm signal that is both audible and visible to a person in the service of the licensee or of an alarm monitoring service under contract to the licensee.

  • (2) A licensee need not comply with subsection (1) if it takes physical protection measures in respect of the area that provide the same level of protection as the devices referred to in that subsection.

  • SOR/2006-191, s. 10

Arrangements with Off-site Response Force

  •  (1) Every licensee shall make or cause to be made written arrangements with an off-site response force that is capable of making an effective intervention at an area where Category III nuclear material is processed, used or stored.

  • (2) The arrangements shall include provisions for

    • (a) annual familiarization visits by members of the off-site response force to the area where the Category III nuclear material is processed, used or stored; and

    • (b) the joint development of a contingency plan by the licensee and the off-site response force to facilitate the force making an effective intervention.

  • (3) If a licensee does not have alarm monitoring capability, the alarm monitoring service under contract to the licensee shall notify the licensee and the off-site response force, immediately on receipt of an alarm signal from the area where the Category III nuclear material is processed, used or stored.

  • SOR/2006-191, s. 10

Requirements for High-security Sites

General Obligations

Application

 Sections 7.4 to 38 apply in respect of high-security sites.

  • SOR/2006-191, s. 10
Design Basis Threat Analysis
  •  (1) The Commission shall establish a design basis threat analysis and update it as necessary to incorporate changes to the design basis threat.

  • (2) The Commission shall provide the current design basis threat analysis to every licensee, who shall take that analysis into account in the design of their physical protection system and make modifications to that system as necessary.

  • SOR/2006-191, s. 10
Facility-specific Threat and Risk Assessment
  •  (1) Every licensee shall conduct, at least once every 12 months, a threat and risk assessment specific to a facility where it carries on licensed activities in order to determine the adequacy of its physical protection system.

  • (2) Every licensee shall make modifications to its physical protection system, as necessary, to counter any credible threat identified as a result of the threat and risk assessment.

  • (3) Every licensee shall keep a written record of each threat and risk assessment that it conducts.

  • (4) Every licensee shall provide a copy of the written record, together with a statement of actions taken as a result of the threat and risk assessment, to the Commission within 60 days after completion of the assessment.

  • SOR/2006-191, s. 10

Location of Nuclear Power Plants

 Every nuclear power plant shall be located within a protected area.

  • SOR/2006-191, s. 10

Requirements Concerning Protected, Inner and Vital Areas

[SOR/2010-108, s. 10(F)]

Barrier Enclosing Protected Area

  •  (1) Every protected area shall be enclosed by a barrier that is located at its perimeter.

  • (2) Subject to subsection (3), the barrier shall be designed and constructed to inhibit any unauthorized entry into the protected area and must be one or a combination of the following structures:

    • (a) a fence at least 2.4 m in height constructed of wire chain links made of wire not smaller than gauge number 11, having openings whose sides do not exceed 6 cm in length, and topped with at least three strands of barbed wire or barbed tape installed parallel to the fence on brackets angled outward;

    • (b) a wall at least 2.4 m in height, including any wall that forms part of a building, constructed of steel, wood, concrete, masonry or other substantial material or composites of such materials and, if it does not form part of a building, topped with at least three strands of barbed wire or barbed tape installed parallel to the wall on brackets angled outward; or

    • (c) a structure that provides the same level of protection as those referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b).

  • (3) For facilities in respect of which a construction licence is issued after the day on which section 9.1 of these Regulations comes into force, the barrier must be designed and constructed to inhibit unauthorized entry into the protected area and must consist of

    • (a) the following elements, namely,

      • (i) an exterior fence extending at least 3 m above grade but otherwise constructed to the specifications set out in paragraph (2)(a),

      • (ii) an interior fence extending at least 2.4 m above grade but otherwise constructed to the specifications set out in paragraph (2)(a), and

      • (iii) a separation of not less than 5 m between the two fences that is free of obstructions, other than guard posts, vehicle portals and intrusion detection and assessment devices; or

    • (b) a structure, whether or not combined with other physical protection measures, that provides the same level of protection as the structures referred to in paragraph (a).

  • (4) Despite subsection (3), permanent security facilities such as guard posts and vehicle portals may join with the exterior and interior fences provided that a continuous barrier is maintained.

  • (5) The interior fence referred to in subparagraph (3)(a)(ii) is considered to be the perimeter of the protected area.

  • (6) Each gate, door, window or other means of entry or exit in the barrier shall be constructed so that it can be closed and locked.

  • (7) Those means of entry or exit shall be kept closed and locked except when persons or land vehicles are entering or exiting the protected area under the direct visual surveillance of a nuclear security officer.

  • SOR/2006-191, s. 11
  • SOR/2010-108, s. 11(F)

Entry of Land Vehicles into Protected Area

  •  (1) Every licensee shall ensure that vehicle portals are used for the entry and exit of land vehicles into and from a protected area.

  • (2) The gates of a vehicle portal shall not be open at the same time, except if required in the event of an emergency.

  • (3) No licensee shall permit a land vehicle to enter a protected area unless there is an operational requirement for it to be there.

  • (4) Every licensee shall implement physical protection measures necessary to reduce the risk of forced land vehicle penetration of a protected area.

  • SOR/2006-191, s. 12

Unobstructed Area Surrounding Protected Area

  •  (1) Every protected area shall be surrounded by an unobstructed area located on both sides of the barrier described in section 9 that extends at least 5 m away from every point of the barrier.

  • (2) The unobstructed area shall be

    • (a) free of any structure, equipment or other obstruction that could be used to penetrate or surmount the barrier or to restrict observation of the unobstructed area; and

    • (b) continuously and uniformly illuminated at an intensity sufficient to permit clear observation of any person within the unobstructed area.

  • (3) Paragraph (2)(a) does not apply to structures in place on the day on which section 9.1 of these Regulations comes into force provided that appropriate physical protection measures are taken to maintain the integrity of the barrier described in section 9.

  • SOR/2006-191, ss. 13, 40(F)
  • SOR/2010-108, s. 12(E)

Protected Area Intrusion Detection

 Every protected area shall be

  • (a) equipped with devices that

    • (i) employ two independent systems that detect intrusion into the protected area,

    • (ii) detect any tampering that may cause any of the devices referred to in subparagraph (i) or (iv) to malfunction or cease to function,

    • (iii) when an event referred to in subparagraph (i) or (ii) is detected, set off a continuous alarm signal that is both audible and visible in a security monitoring room and that can be stopped only by a nuclear security officer, and

    • (iv) facilitate an immediate assessment of the cause of the alarm; or

  • (b) kept under the direct visual surveillance of a nuclear security officer who is equipped with a device that can set off a continuous alarm signal that

    • (i) is both audible and visible in a security monitoring room, and

    • (ii) can be stopped only by a nuclear security officer from the security monitoring room.

  • SOR/2006-191, ss. 14, 39

Location of Inner Area

 Every inner area shall be located within a protected area.

Structure or Barrier Enclosing Inner Area

[SOR/2006-191, s. 40(F)]
  •  (1) Every inner area shall be totally enclosed by a structure or barrier that is designed and constructed to prevent, alone or in combination with other structures or barriers, persons from completing both of the following actions before an on-site nuclear response force can make an effective intervention:

    • (a) gaining unauthorized access to Category I nuclear material by using hand-held tools, weapons or explosive substances; and

    • (b) removing the nuclear material from the inner area.

  • (2) The structure or barrier that encloses an inner area shall be located at least 5 m away from every point of the barrier that encloses the protected area.

  • (3) Each gate, door, window or other means of entry or exit in the structure or barrier that encloses an inner area shall be kept closed and locked with a device that, from outside the structure or barrier, can only be unlocked by two persons authorized under section 18, using two different keys or combinations at the same time.

  • (4) No person authorized to enter an inner area under section 18 shall enter that area unless at least one other person authorized to enter the area enters and remains in the area at the same time.

  • (5) No licensee shall permit a land vehicle to enter an inner area except when there is an operational requirement for it to be there.

  • SOR/2006-191, s. 15

Inner Area Intrusion Detection

 Every inner area shall be

  • (a) equipped with devices that

    • (i) employ two independent systems that detect intrusion into, and unauthorized movement within and out of, the inner area,

    • (ii) detect any tampering that may cause any of the devices referred to in subparagraph (i) or (iv) to malfunction or cease to function,

    • (iii) when an event referred to in subparagraph (i) or (ii) is detected, set off two independent continuous alarm signals each of which is both audible and visible, one in the security monitoring room that can be stopped only from that room by a nuclear security officer, and the other in at least one other attended place outside the inner area that can be stopped only from that place by a person who is authorized to enter the inner area under section 18, and

    • (iv) facilitate an immediate assessment of the cause of an alarm; or

  • (b) kept under the direct visual surveillance of a nuclear security officer who is equipped with a device that can set off a continuous alarm signal that

    • (i) is both audible and visible in a security monitoring room and in at least one other attended place outside the inner area, and

    • (ii) can be stopped only by a nuclear security officer from the security monitoring room or by a person who is authorized to enter the inner area in accordance with section 18 from another attended place outside the inner area.

  • SOR/2006-191, ss. 16, 39

Vital Areas

 Every licensee shall identify all vital areas and implement physical protection measures — including access control and measures designed to delay unauthorized access — taking into account the design basis threat and any other credible threat identified by a threat and risk assessment.

  • SOR/2006-191, s. 17

Security Monitoring Room

  •  (1) Every licensee shall monitor from a security monitoring room, access to which is controlled by the licensee, the following:

    • (a) the protected area devices referred to in subparagraphs 11(a)(i) to (iv);

    • (b) the inner area devices referred to in subparagraphs 14(a)(i) to (iv); and

    • (c) those physical protection measures, implemented in accordance with section 14.1, that consist of devices that

      • (i) detect intrusion,

      • (ii) detect any tampering that may cause a device referred to in subparagraph (i) or (iv) to malfunction or cease to function,

      • (iii) set off an alarm when an event referred to in subparagraph (i) or (ii) is detected, and

      • (iv) facilitate the immediate assessment of the cause of the alarm.

  • (2) The security monitoring room shall be

    • (a) located outside any inner area;

    • (b) designed, constructed and situated so as to reduce vulnerability to damage and to resist forced entry by the use of hand-held tools, weapons, explosive substances or land vehicles until the on-site nuclear response force can make an effective intervention;

    • (c) equipped with

      • (i) a two-way radio that can be used to communicate with both the on-site nuclear response force and the off-site response force,

      • (ii) a device that can be used at any time to alert the off-site response force,

      • (iii) a telephone, and

      • (iv) equipment that permits direct communication with each nuclear security officer who is stationed outside the security monitoring room;

    • (d) located and equipped so as to enable a nuclear security officer inside the security monitoring room to receive and acknowledge the audible and visible alarm signals referred to in subparagraph 11(a)(iii), paragraph 11(b), subparagraph 14(a)(iii) and paragraph 14(b); and

    • (e) attended at all times by at least one nuclear security officer.

  • (3) A licensee shall monitor the alarm devices referred to in subparagraphs (1)(c)(iii), 11(a)(iii) and 14(a)(iii) using a primary alarm monitoring system and a backup system. The backup system shall maintain the operation of the alarm monitoring function, including key computer systems, in the event of a failure of equipment essential to the functioning of the primary system.

  • SOR/2006-191, ss. 18, 39

Uninterrupted Power Supply

 A physical protection system shall include a physical protection measure that, in the event of the loss of power, maintains an uninterrupted power supply for a period sufficient to allow for an alternate continuous power supply to be implemented for

  • (a) all devices required by this Part related to intrusion detection and the immediate assessment of the cause of an alarm, other than lighting as required by paragraph 10(2)(b); and

  • (b) the devices referred to in paragraph 15(2)(c).

  • SOR/2006-191, s. 19
  • SOR/2010-108, s. 13(F)

Key Control

  •  (1) Every licensee shall maintain records of all devices, including keys and locks, whether electronic or manual, used to control access to protected, inner or vital areas or to Category I, II or III nuclear material.

  • (2) The records shall list all devices and their combinations, if any, that have been issued, the date of issue and the individuals to whom they were issued.

  • (3) If there are reasonable grounds to believe that any device or combination is defective or has been lost, stolen or unlawfully transferred or has otherwise become insecure, as the case may be, the licensee shall immediately take all measures necessary to restore the integrity of the device or combination believed to be affected.

  • (4) A licensee shall not issue a device or combination controlling access to a protected, inner or vital area or to Category I, II or III nuclear material to any person unless an authorization referred to in subsection 17(1) or 18(1), (2) or (3), as the case may be, has been issued to them and they are required to access that area in the performance of their duties.

  • SOR/2006-191, s. 19

Site Plan

 Every licensee shall maintain a site plan that indicates the location and includes a description of the following, if applicable:

  • (a) the perimeter of the lands on which a high-security site is located;

  • (b) the barrier enclosing every protected area;

  • (c) the protected areas;

  • (d) the unobstructed areas that meet the requirements set out in section 10;

  • (e) the structure or barrier enclosing every inner area;

  • (f) the inner areas; and

  • (g) the vital areas.

  • SOR/2006-191, ss. 20, 40(F)

Entry Into Protected And Inner Areas

Entry into Protected Area

  •  (1) No person shall enter a protected area without physical proof of the recorded authorization of the licensee.

  • (1.1) In this section, site access security clearance means a clearance granted by a licensee to a person based on a security assessment for site access security clearances referred to in the Personnel Security Standard or on an equivalent security assessment.

  • (1.2) A site access security clearance is valid for five years.

  • (2) Subject to subsection (3), a licensee shall, before issuing an authorization to enter a protected area to a person, prepare an identification report that contains the following information and documents:

    • (a) the person’s name and date and place of birth;

    • (b) documentary proof of the person’s lawful presence in Canada;

    • (c) the address of the person’s principal residence;

    • (d) a photograph depicting a frontal view of the person’s face;

    • (e) the person’s occupation; and

    • (f) a copy of the site access security clearance for that person.

  • (3) A licensee may issue an authorization to enter a protected area to a person without preparing an identification report if

    • (a) the person provides the licensee with documentary proof of the person’s name and address; and

    • (b) the authorization is issued subject to the condition that the person must be escorted within the protected area at all times by a person who has the recorded authorization of the licensee to enter that area and for whom the licensee has prepared an identification report.

  • (4) No licensee shall permit a person who has an authorization issued under subsection (3) to enter or remain in the protected area unless the person is escorted at all times by a person who has the recorded authorization of the licensee to enter that area and for whom the licensee has prepared an identification report.

  • (5) An authorization to enter a protected area may be issued for any term not exceeding five years and shall be subject to any terms and conditions that are necessary to minimize the risk to the security of the area.

  • (6) Every licensee shall give to a person who has sought an authorization to enter a protected area, on the person’s request, a copy of any information or documents referred to in subsection (2) that the licensee possesses.

  • SOR/2006-191, s. 21
  • SOR/2010-108, s. 14(F)

Verification of Identity

 On the entry into a protected area of a person to whom an authorization referred to in subsection 17(1) has been issued, that person’s identity shall be verified by two separate personnel identity verification systems, one of which is an access card reader and the other of which is a biometric personnel identity verification device.

  • SOR/2006-191, s. 22

Authorizations

  •  (1) Subject to subsection 20(1), no person shall enter an inner area without the recorded authorization of the licensee.

  • (2) Subject to section 18.6, no person shall act as a nuclear security officer without the recorded authorization of the licensee.

  • (3) Subject to subsection 20(2), no person shall act as a physical protection system support person without the recorded authorization of the licensee.

  • SOR/2006-191, s. 22

Security Clearance

 A licensee shall, before issuing an authorization referred to in subsection 18(1) or (3) to a person referred to in that subsection, perform a credit check in respect of the person, obtain the information and documents referred to in paragraphs 17(2)(a) to (e) and grant a security clearance to the person that is valid for five years and is equivalent to a “Secret” level security clearance referred to in the Personnel Security Standard or higher.

  • SOR/2006-191, s. 22

Additional Requirements for Nuclear Security Officers

 A licensee, before issuing an authorization referred to in subsection 18(2) to a person referred to in that subsection, shall satisfy the conditions set out in section 18.1 in respect of the person — other than the condition set out in paragraph 17(2)(b) — and shall obtain from the person

  • (a) documentary proof that the person is a Canadian citizen or a permanent resident within the meaning of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act;

  • (b) a certificate, signed by a duly qualified medical practitioner, certifying that the person does not have a medical condition that would prevent them from performing the tasks that are likely to be assigned by the licensee;

  • (c) a certificate, signed by a fitness consultant recognized by the Canadian Society for Exercise Physiology or a person with equivalent or higher qualifications, certifying that the person is physically able to perform tasks that are likely to be assigned by the licensee; and

  • (d) a certificate, signed by a duly qualified psychologist, certifying that the person is psychologically able to perform tasks that are likely to be assigned by the licensee.

  • SOR/2006-191, s. 22

Included Authorizations

  •  (1) An authorization referred to in subsection 18(2) or (3) includes an authorization to enter an inner area.

  • (2) An authorization referred to in section 18 includes an authorization to enter a protected area.

  • SOR/2006-191, s. 22

Term of Authorization

 An authorization referred to in section 18 may be issued for any term not exceeding five years and shall be subject to any terms and conditions necessary to minimize the risk to the security of the facility.

  • SOR/2006-191, s. 22

Copy of Information and Documents

 Every licensee shall give to a person for whom an authorization referred to in section 18 has been sought, at the person’s request, a copy of any information or documents relating to the authorization in the licensee’s possession that were submitted to the licensee by or on behalf of the person.

  • SOR/2006-191, s. 22

Transitional Period

  •  (1) Despite section 18.2, a nuclear security officer need not be granted the security clearance referred to in section 18.1 until one year after the coming into force of this section if he or she was a nuclear security guard immediately before that coming into force.

  • (2) Despite section 18.2, a licensee need not obtain the certificates referred to in paragraphs 18.2(c) and (d) from a person referred to in that section until one year after the coming into force of this section.

  • SOR/2006-191, s. 22

List of Authorized Persons

  •  (1) Every licensee shall establish and maintain a list of all persons to whom an authorization referred to in section 18 has been issued.

  • (2) Every licensee shall, upon request, provide the list to the Commission or a person who is designated as an inspector under section 29 of the Act.

  • SOR/2006-191, s. 22

Authorization for Escorted Access

  •  (1) A person who does not have an authorization referred to in subsection 18(1) may enter an inner area if they do so for the purpose of performing duties required by the licensee and they have the written authorization of the licensee.

  • (2) A person who does not have an authorization referred to in subsection 18(3) may act as a physical protection system support person if they do so for the purpose of performing duties required by the licensee and they have the written authorization of the licensee.

  • SOR/2006-191, s. 22

Required Information

 A licensee shall, before issuing an authorization referred to in subsection 20(1) or (2), obtain the following information:

  • (a) the name of the person for whom the authorization is sought;

  • (b) the address of the person’s principal residence;

  • (c) the name and business address of the person’s employer; and

  • (d) documentary proof of the person’s lawful presence in Canada.

  • SOR/2006-191, s. 22

Conditions

  •  (1) A licensee shall, when issuing an authorization referred to in subsection 20(1), make it subject to the condition that the person must be escorted at all times within the inner area by two persons who have the authorization referred to in either subsection 18(1) or (2).

  • (2) A licensee shall, when issuing an authorization referred to in subsection 20(2), make it subject to the condition that the physical protection system support person must be escorted at all times

    • (a) within the protected area by a person who has the authorization referred to in subsection 18(3); and

    • (b) within the inner area, by two persons, one of whom has the authorization referred to in subsection 18(3) and the other of whom has the authorization referred to in subsection 18(1), (2) or (3).

  • (3) No licensee shall permit a person who has an authorization referred to in section 20 to enter or remain in an inner area or act as a physical protection system support person unless they are escorted at all times as required by subsection (1) or (2).

  • SOR/2006-191, s. 22

Prohibition on Permitting Access to Protected Area or Inner Area

 Except as otherwise provided in this Part, no licensee shall permit any person to enter or remain in a protected area or an inner area unless the person is a member of an off-site response force, a peace officer or a member of another external emergency response force who requires access to that area for the purpose of carrying out their duties.

  • SOR/2006-191, s. 22

Revocation of Authorization by Licensee

  •  (1) A licensee shall revoke an authorization issued under section 17, 18 or 20 if

    • (a) there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person who has the authorization poses or could pose a risk to the security of a facility;

    • (b) the person is no longer employed by or otherwise under contract to the licensee;

    • (c) the duties or functions of the person have been completed, suspended or otherwise terminated; or

    • (d) the authorization is no longer required by the person in order for them to perform their duties.

  • (2) Subject to subsection (3), a licensee shall immediately notify the Commission in writing of any revocation made under subsection (1) and the reasons for it.

  • (3) If a revocation is in respect of an authorization under section 17, a licensee need not inform the Commission of the revocation and the reasons for it unless the revocation was made because there were reasonable grounds to believe that the person to whom the authorization was issued posed or could have posed a risk to the security of the facility.

  • SOR/2006-191, s. 22
  • SOR/2015-67, s. 6

 [Repealed, SOR/2006-191, s. 22]

Unlocking and Opening Means of Entry into Inner Area

  •  (1) No licensee shall permit a gate, door, window or other means of entry or exit in the structure or barrier that encloses an inner area to be unlocked, opened or kept open unless

    • (a) it is kept open only for the time required to allow the passage of persons or things into or out of the inner area; and

    • (b) while it is open, it is kept under the direct visual surveillance of a nuclear security officer who is dedicated exclusively to that task.

  • (2) No licensee shall permit a gate, door, window or other means of entry or exit in the structure or barrier that encloses an inner area to be unlocked from the outside unless it is unlocked by two persons who are authorized to enter the inner area in accordance with section 18, only one of whom is a nuclear security officer.

  • SOR/2006-191, ss. 39, 40(F)

Unauthorized Persons

  •  (1) No licensee shall permit an unauthorized person to enter or remain in a protected area or an inner area.

  • (2) If a person sees anyone in a protected area or an inner area who the person believes, on reasonable grounds, is not authorized to be in the area, the person shall immediately report that fact to the nearest nuclear security officer.

  • SOR/2006-191, s. 39

Monitoring and Preventing Entry

 Every licensee shall ensure that weapons and explosive substances are not taken into a protected area or an inner area unless they are under the control of a nuclear security officer or a member of an on-site nuclear response force or an off-site response force.

  • SOR/2006-191, s. 23

Monitoring and Preventing Removal

 Every licensee shall ensure that Category I, II or III nuclear material is not removed from a protected area or an inner area unless the removal is carried out in accordance with a licence.

Searches

  •  (1) Every licensee shall post, at the entrance to each protected area and inner area, a sign that is visible to any person who is about to enter the area, stating that the licensee may not permit persons to

    • (a) enter the area unless they allow a nuclear security officer to search them and everything in their possession, including any land vehicle, for weapons and explosive substances; and

    • (b) leave the area unless they allow a nuclear security officer to search them and everything in their possession, including any land vehicle, for Category I, II or III nuclear material.

  • (2) Subject to section 27.1, no licensee shall permit any person to enter or leave a protected area or an inner area unless

    • (a) on entering the area, the person and everything in their possession, including any land vehicle, has been searched for weapons and explosive substances and, in the case of a land vehicle, for unauthorized persons, by a nuclear security officer, who is physically present using appropriate detection and screening devices; and

    • (b) on leaving the area, the person and everything in their possession, including any land vehicle, has been searched for Category I, II or III nuclear material by a nuclear security officer using devices capable of detecting that material.

  • (3) [Repealed, SOR/2006-191, s. 24]

  • (4) No licensee who has a reasonable suspicion that a person who is in a protected area or an inner area has in their possession weapons or explosive substances that are not under the control of a nuclear security officer or a member of an on-site nuclear response force or an off-site response force or has in their possession Category I, II or III nuclear material without the authorization of the licensee shall permit the person to remain in either area without the person and everything in their possession, including any land vehicle, being searched by a nuclear security officer for the weapons, explosive substances or nuclear material.

  • (5) A search of a person conducted under this section shall be

    • (a) a non-intrusive search carried out by means of a hand-held scanner, a walk-through scanner or any similar device; and

    • (b) if a nuclear security officer determines that it is necessary in order to maintain security, a frisk search carried out by a person of the same sex as the person being searched and extending from head to foot, down the front and rear of the body, around the legs and inside clothing folds, pockets and footwear.

  • (6) [Repealed, SOR/2006-191, s. 24]

  • SOR/2006-191, ss. 24, 39

Exception to Search Requirements

  •  (1) The search requirements set out in subsection 27(2) do not apply to a nuclear security officer or a member of an on-site nuclear response force who is entering a protected area or an inner area on foot, or who requires emergency access to or egress from a facility, as the case may be, for the purposes of carrying out their duties, if their identity as a nuclear security officer or a member of that force has been verified in accordance with section 17.1.

  • (2) The search requirements set out in subsection 27(2) do not apply to a member of an off-site response force, a peace officer or a member of another external emergency response force who requires emergency access to or egress from a facility, as the case may be, for the purpose of carrying out their duties, if

    • (a) they provide identification or other evidence that satisfactorily establishes that they are a member of an off-site response force, a peace officer or a member of another external emergency response force;

    • (b) the purpose of their emergency access to or egress from the facility is verified by a nuclear security officer; and

    • (c) while at the facility, they are escorted in the manner set out in subsection 17(4) or 20.2(1), as the case may be.

  • SOR/2006-191, s. 25

Prohibited Activities

  •  (1) No person who refuses to submit to a search referred to in section 27 shall enter or leave a protected area or an inner area.

  • (2) No person shall

    • (a) take any weapons or explosive substances into a protected area or an inner area unless they are under the control of a nuclear security officer or a member of an on-site nuclear response force or an off-site response force; or

    • (b) remove any Category I, II or III nuclear material from a protected area or an inner area without the authorization of the licensee.

  • SOR/2006-191, s. 26

Exception for Inspectors

 Sections 17, 18 and 20 do not apply to or in respect of an inspector who is designated under section 29 of the Act to carry out inspections at a high-security site.

  • SOR/2006-191, s. 27

Nuclear Security Officers

Number and Duties

 Every licensee shall at all times have available at a facility at which it carries on licensed activities a sufficient number of nuclear security officers to enable the licensee to comply with this Part and do the following:

  • (a) control the movement of persons, materials and land vehicles;

  • (b) conduct searches of persons, materials and land vehicles for weapons, explosive substances and Category I, II or III nuclear material;

  • (c) conduct preventive foot and land vehicle patrols of the facility and the perimeter of the protected area to inspect for security breaches and vulnerabilities;

  • (d) respond to and assess alarm incidents;

  • (e) apprehend and detain unarmed intruders;

  • (f) observe and report on the movements of armed intruders; and

  • (g) operate security equipment and systems.

  • SOR/2006-191, s. 28

Equipment

 Every licensee shall provide nuclear security officers with the equipment required to perform the duties set out in section 30, including

  • (a) a bullet-resistant vest;

  • (b) portable communications equipment equipped with a device, referred to in paragraphs 11(b) and 14(b), that can set off a continuous alarm signal that is both audible and visible in the security monitoring room;

  • (c) a restraining device; and

  • (d) a night vision device.

  • 2001, c. 27, s. 273
  • SOR/2006-191, s. 29

On-site Nuclear Response Force

 Every licensee shall at all times maintain an on-site nuclear response force that is capable of making an effective intervention, taking into account the design basis threat and any other credible threat identified by a threat and risk assessment.

  • SOR/2006-191, s. 29

 [Repealed, SOR/2006-191, s. 29]

Training

  •  (1) Every licensee shall train each of its nuclear security officers in respect of the relevant and current security duties and responsibilities.

  • (2) Every licensee shall, within the 30-day period before issuing an authorization referred to in subsection 18(2) to a person, examine the person’s familiarity with the relevant and current security duties and responsibilities.

  • SOR/2006-191, ss. 30, 39

Protection Arrangements, Contingency Plans and Security Exercises and Drills

Protection Arrangements with Off-site Response Force

  •  (1) Every licensee shall make or cause to be made written arrangements with an off-site response force to provide for the protection of a facility at which it carries on licensed activities.

  • (2) The arrangements shall include provisions

    • (a) to ensure that there is capability at all times for immediate communication among the security monitoring room, the on-site nuclear response force and the off-site response force;

    • (b) to ensure that the off-site response force can support the on-site nuclear response force in making an effective intervention when requested to do so by the licensee;

    • (c) for the installation of a two-way radio referred to in subparagraph 15(2)(c)(i) and an alarm device referred to in subparagraph 15(2)(c)(ii);

    • (d) for annual familiarization visits to the facility by members of the off-site response force; and

    • (e) for consultation between the licensee and the off-site response force regarding the arrangements, the resources and the equipment available to the licensee and the off-site response force, and any other matter relating to the security of the facility.

  • SOR/2006-191, s. 31
  • SOR/2010-108, s. 15(F)

Contingency Plans and Security Exercises and Drills

  •  (1) Every licensee shall develop and maintain or cause to be developed and maintained, in cooperation with the off-site response force referred to in subsection 35(1), a contingency plan to ensure that an effective intervention can be made, taking into account the design basis threat and any other credible threat identified by a threat and risk assessment.

  • (2) Every licensee shall conduct or cause to be conducted at a facility at which it carries on licensed activities, in cooperation with the off-site response force, at least one security exercise every two years to test the effectiveness of the contingency plan and of the physical protection system.

  • (3) Every licensee shall notify the Commission in writing of its intention to conduct a security exercise at least 60 days before the exercise date.

  • (4) Every licensee shall conduct a security drill at the facility at least once each 30 days to test the operation of one or more of its physical protection measures and the readiness of its security personnel.

  • SOR/2006-191, s. 31

Records to Be Kept, Retained and Made Available

  •  (1) Every licensee shall

    • (a) keep a record of the name of each person to whom an authorization to enter a protected area or an inner area has been issued;

    • (b) retain the record for one year after the authorization expires or is revoked; and

    • (c) make a copy of the record available to its nuclear security officers.

  • (2) Every licensee shall keep a record of the duties and responsibilities of its nuclear security officers and shall give a copy of that record to each of them.

  • (3) Every licensee shall keep a record of the training received by each of its nuclear security officers.

  • SOR/2006-191, s. 39

Supervisory Awareness Program

 Every licensee shall develop a supervisory awareness program and implement it on an ongoing basis to ensure that its supervisors are trained to recognize behavioural changes in all personnel, including contractors, that could pose a risk to security at a facility at which it carries on licensed activities.

  • SOR/2006-191, s. 32

PART 2Security of Nuclear Facilities Listed in Schedule 2

Interpretation

 In this Part, facility-access security clearance means a clearance granted to a person by a licensee permitting access to a nuclear facility to which this Part applies.

  • SOR/2006-191, s. 32

Application

  •  (1) This Part applies in respect of a nuclear facility set out in column 2 of Schedule 2 that is

    • (a) operated by a licensee set out in column 1 of that schedule; or

    • (b) at any time after being operated by a licensee referred to in paragraph (a), operated by another licensee.

  • (2) If the provisions of both Part 1 and this Part apply to a licensee, the provisions of Part 1 that relate to Category I and II nuclear material shall prevail to the extent of any inconsistency.

  • (3) Despite sections 7.1 and 7.2, this Part applies to a licensee that processes, uses or stores Category III nuclear material.

  • SOR/2006-191, s. 32

Licence Applications

 An application for a licence in respect of a nuclear facility shall contain, in addition to the information required by sections 3 to 8 of the Class I Nuclear Facilities Regulations, a description of the physical protection measures to be taken to ensure compliance with sections 42 to 48.

  • SOR/2006-191, s. 32

Access Control at Nuclear Facilities

  •  (1) No licensee shall permit any person to enter or remain in a nuclear facility unless the person has a facility-access security clearance or is

    • (a) escorted at all times by a person who has a facility-access security clearance;

    • (b) a member of an off-site response force, a peace officer or a member of another external emergency response force who requires access for the purpose of carrying out their duties at the site of the nuclear facility; or

    • (c) an inspector who is designated under section 29 of the Act to carry out inspections at a nuclear facility.

  • (2) Before granting a facility-access security clearance to a person, a licensee shall verify the following information:

    • (a) a record emanating from the Canadian Police Information Centre or from a police service serving the locality where the facility is located, showing the results of a criminal record name check on the person;

    • (b) the person’s personal history, composed of their educational achievement, professional qualifications, employment history and character references, unless the person has been employed for more than 10 years at the facility; and

    • (c) if a person’s personal history cannot be established for at least the last five years, information relating to the trustworthiness of the person including, where available, a criminal record name check on that person from each country in which the person has resided for one or more years in the last five years.

  • (3) A facility-access security clearance may be granted for any term not exceeding five years and shall be subject to any terms and conditions necessary to minimize the risk to the security of the nuclear facility.

  • (4) For the purposes of subsection (1), a licensee may accept a facility-access security clearance granted by another licensee or an authorization referred to in subsection 17(1) or section 18.

  • SOR/2006-191, s. 32

List of Authorized Persons

  •  (1) Every licensee shall establish and maintain a list of all persons to whom a facility-access security clearance has been granted under section 42.

  • (2) Every licensee shall, upon request, provide the list to the Commission or a person who is designated as an inspector under section 29 of the Act.

  • SOR/2006-191, s. 32

Revocation of Facility-access Security Clearance

  •  (1) A licensee may revoke a facility-access security clearance if

    • (a) there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person who has the facility-access security clearance poses or could pose a risk to the security of a nuclear facility;

    • (b) the person is no longer employed by or otherwise under contract to the licensee;

    • (c) the duties or functions of the person have been completed, suspended or otherwise terminated; or

    • (d) the facility-access security clearance is no longer required by the person in order for them to perform their duties.

  • (2) A licensee shall immediately notify the Commission in writing of any revocation made under paragraph (1)(a).

  • SOR/2006-191, s. 32

Entry of Land Vehicles

 No licensee shall permit a land vehicle to enter a nuclear facility unless

  • (a) there is an operational requirement for it to be there and it is searched for explosive substances, weapons and unauthorized persons; or

  • (b) it is used by a member of an off-site response force, a peace officer or a member of another external emergency response force for the purpose of carrying out their duties.

  • SOR/2006-191, s. 32

Security of Nuclear Substances

  •  (1) Every licensee shall process, use and store nuclear substances and other radioactive material in an area within a nuclear facility that is under the visual surveillance of the licensee, or is designed and constructed to prevent persons from gaining unauthorized access to those substances and that material.

  • (2) Subject to subsection (3), a licensee shall ensure that the area is equipped with devices that

    • (a) detect any intrusion into it;

    • (b) detect any tampering that may cause any of the devices to malfunction or cease to function; and

    • (c) when an event referred to in paragraph (a) or (b) is detected, set off a continuous alarm signal that is both audible and visible to a person in the service of the licensee or of an alarm monitoring service under contract to the licensee.

  • (3) A licensee need not comply with subsection (2) if it takes physical protection measures in respect of the area that provide the same level of protection as the devices referred to in that subsection.

  • SOR/2006-191, s. 32

Arrangements with Off-site Response Force

  •  (1) Every licensee shall make or cause to be made written arrangements with an off-site response force that is capable of making an effective intervention at the nuclear facility.

  • (2) The arrangements shall include provisions for

    • (a) annual familiarization visits to the nuclear facility by members of the off-site response force; and

    • (b) the joint development of a contingency plan by the licensee and the off-site response force to facilitate the force making an effective intervention.

  • (3) If a licensee does not have alarm monitoring capability, the alarm monitoring service under contract to the licensee shall notify the licensee and the off-site response force, immediately on receipt of an alarm signal from the nuclear facility or the area referred to in subsection 46(1).

  • SOR/2006-191, s. 32

Supervisory Awareness Program

 Every licensee shall develop a supervisory awareness program and implement it on an ongoing basis to ensure that its supervisors are trained to recognize behavioural changes in all personnel, including contractors, that could pose a risk to security at a facility at which it carries on licensed activities.

  • SOR/2006-191, s. 32

SCHEDULE 1(Section 1)

Category I, II and III Nuclear Material

Column 1Column 2Column 3Column 4Column 5
ItemNuclear SubstanceFormQuantity

(Category I)Footnote for Category I, II and III Nuclear Material1

Quantity

(Category II)Footnote for Category I, II and III Nuclear Material1

Quantity

(Category III)Footnote for Category I, II and III Nuclear Material1,Footnote for Category I, II and III Nuclear Material5

1PlutoniumFootnote for Category I, II and III Nuclear Material2UnirradiatedFootnote for Category I, II and III Nuclear Material32 kg or moreLess than 2 kg, but more than 500 g500 g or less, but more than 15 g
2Uranium 235UnirradiatedFootnote for Category I, II and III Nuclear Material3 — uranium enriched to 20% 235U or more5 kg or moreLess than 5 kg, but more than 1 kg1 kg or less, but more than 15 g
3Uranium 235UnirradiatedFootnote for Category I, II and III Nuclear Material3 — uranium enriched to 10% 235U or more, but less than 20% 235UN/A10 kg or moreLess than 10 kg, but more than 1 kg
4Uranium 235UnirradiatedFootnote for Category I, II and III Nuclear Material3 — uranium enriched above natural, but less than 10% 235UN/AN/A10 kg or more
5Uranium 233UnirradiatedFootnote for Category I, II and III Nuclear Material32 kg or moreLess than 2 kg, but more than 500 g500 g or less, but more than 15 g
6Fuel consisting of depleted or natural uranium, thorium or low-enriched fuel (less than 10% fissile content)Footnote for Category I, II and III Nuclear Material4IrradiatedN/AMore than 500 g of plutonium500 g or less, but more than 15 g of plutonium
  • Return to footnote 1The quantities listed refer to the aggregate of each kind of nuclear substance located at a facility, excluding the following (which are considered separate quantities):

    • (a) 
      any quantity of the nuclear substance that is not within 1 000 m of another quantity of the nuclear substance; and
    • (b) 
      any quantity of the nuclear substance that is located in a locked building or a structure offering similar resistance to unauthorized entry.
  • Return to footnote 2All plutonium except that with isotopic concentration exceeding 80% in plutonium 238.

  • Return to footnote 3Material not irradiated in a reactor or material irradiated in a reactor but with a radiation level equal to or less than 1 Gy/h at 1 m unshielded.

  • Return to footnote 4Other fuel that by virtue of its original fissile content is classified as Category I or II before irradiation may be reduced one category level while the radiation level from the fuel exceeds 1 Gy/h at 1 m unshielded.

  • Return to footnote 5Quantities less than the quantities set out in column 5 for Category III nuclear material and any quantities of natural uranium, depleted uranium and thorium should be protected at least in accordance with prudent security practice.

  • SOR/2006-191, ss. 33, 34(F), 35, 36, 40(F)

SCHEDULE 2(Section 1 and subsection 40(1))

Licensees and Nuclear Facilities

Column 1Column 2
ItemName of LicenseeNuclear Facility
1Cameco Corporation
  • (a) Port Hope Nuclear Fuel Facility (Ontario)

  • (b) Blind River Nuclear Fuel Facility (Ontario)

2General Electric Canada Inc.
  • (a) Peterborough Nuclear Fuel Facility (Ontario)

  • (b) Toronto Nuclear Fuel Facility (Ontario)

3MDS Nordion, A Division of MDS (Canada) Inc.Nuclear substance processing facility in Ottawa (Ontario)
4Shield Source IncorporatedNuclear substance processing facility in Peterborough (Ontario)
5SRB Technologies (Canada) Inc.Nuclear substance processing facility in Pembroke (Ontario)
6Zircatec Precision Industries Inc.Port Hope Nuclear Fuel Facility (Ontario)
  • SOR/2006-191, s. 37
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