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Nuclear Security Regulations (SOR/2000-209)

Regulations are current to 2022-11-16 and last amended on 2015-06-12. Previous Versions

PART 1Security of Certain Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (continued)

General Obligations Relating to Category I, II or III Nuclear Material (continued)

[
  • SOR/2006-191, s. 8
]

Arrangements with Off-site Response Force

  •  (1) Every licensee shall make or cause to be made written arrangements with an off-site response force that is capable of making an effective intervention at an area where Category III nuclear material is processed, used or stored.

  • (2) The arrangements shall include provisions for

    • (a) annual familiarization visits by members of the off-site response force to the area where the Category III nuclear material is processed, used or stored; and

    • (b) the joint development of a contingency plan by the licensee and the off-site response force to facilitate the force making an effective intervention.

  • (3) If a licensee does not have alarm monitoring capability, the alarm monitoring service under contract to the licensee shall notify the licensee and the off-site response force, immediately on receipt of an alarm signal from the area where the Category III nuclear material is processed, used or stored.

  • SOR/2006-191, s. 10

Requirements for High-security Sites

General Obligations

Application

 Sections 7.4 to 38 apply in respect of high-security sites.

  • SOR/2006-191, s. 10
Design Basis Threat Analysis
  •  (1) The Commission shall establish a design basis threat analysis and update it as necessary to incorporate changes to the design basis threat.

  • (2) The Commission shall provide the current design basis threat analysis to every licensee, who shall take that analysis into account in the design of their physical protection system and make modifications to that system as necessary.

  • SOR/2006-191, s. 10
Facility-specific Threat and Risk Assessment
  •  (1) Every licensee shall conduct, at least once every 12 months, a threat and risk assessment specific to a facility where it carries on licensed activities in order to determine the adequacy of its physical protection system.

  • (2) Every licensee shall make modifications to its physical protection system, as necessary, to counter any credible threat identified as a result of the threat and risk assessment.

  • (3) Every licensee shall keep a written record of each threat and risk assessment that it conducts.

  • (4) Every licensee shall provide a copy of the written record, together with a statement of actions taken as a result of the threat and risk assessment, to the Commission within 60 days after completion of the assessment.

  • SOR/2006-191, s. 10

Location of Nuclear Power Plants

 Every nuclear power plant shall be located within a protected area.

  • SOR/2006-191, s. 10

Requirements Concerning Protected, Inner and Vital Areas

[
  • SOR/2010-108, s. 10(F)
]

Barrier Enclosing Protected Area

  •  (1) Every protected area shall be enclosed by a barrier that is located at its perimeter.

  • (2) Subject to subsection (3), the barrier shall be designed and constructed to inhibit any unauthorized entry into the protected area and must be one or a combination of the following structures:

    • (a) a fence at least 2.4 m in height constructed of wire chain links made of wire not smaller than gauge number 11, having openings whose sides do not exceed 6 cm in length, and topped with at least three strands of barbed wire or barbed tape installed parallel to the fence on brackets angled outward;

    • (b) a wall at least 2.4 m in height, including any wall that forms part of a building, constructed of steel, wood, concrete, masonry or other substantial material or composites of such materials and, if it does not form part of a building, topped with at least three strands of barbed wire or barbed tape installed parallel to the wall on brackets angled outward; or

    • (c) a structure that provides the same level of protection as those referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b).

  • (3) For facilities in respect of which a construction licence is issued after the day on which section 9.1 of these Regulations comes into force, the barrier must be designed and constructed to inhibit unauthorized entry into the protected area and must consist of

    • (a) the following elements, namely,

      • (i) an exterior fence extending at least 3 m above grade but otherwise constructed to the specifications set out in paragraph (2)(a),

      • (ii) an interior fence extending at least 2.4 m above grade but otherwise constructed to the specifications set out in paragraph (2)(a), and

      • (iii) a separation of not less than 5 m between the two fences that is free of obstructions, other than guard posts, vehicle portals and intrusion detection and assessment devices; or

    • (b) a structure, whether or not combined with other physical protection measures, that provides the same level of protection as the structures referred to in paragraph (a).

  • (4) Despite subsection (3), permanent security facilities such as guard posts and vehicle portals may join with the exterior and interior fences provided that a continuous barrier is maintained.

  • (5) The interior fence referred to in subparagraph (3)(a)(ii) is considered to be the perimeter of the protected area.

  • (6) Each gate, door, window or other means of entry or exit in the barrier shall be constructed so that it can be closed and locked.

  • (7) Those means of entry or exit shall be kept closed and locked except when persons or land vehicles are entering or exiting the protected area under the direct visual surveillance of a nuclear security officer.

  • SOR/2006-191, s. 11
  • SOR/2010-108, s. 11(F)

Entry of Land Vehicles into Protected Area

  •  (1) Every licensee shall ensure that vehicle portals are used for the entry and exit of land vehicles into and from a protected area.

  • (2) The gates of a vehicle portal shall not be open at the same time, except if required in the event of an emergency.

  • (3) No licensee shall permit a land vehicle to enter a protected area unless there is an operational requirement for it to be there.

  • (4) Every licensee shall implement physical protection measures necessary to reduce the risk of forced land vehicle penetration of a protected area.

  • SOR/2006-191, s. 12

Unobstructed Area Surrounding Protected Area

  •  (1) Every protected area shall be surrounded by an unobstructed area located on both sides of the barrier described in section 9 that extends at least 5 m away from every point of the barrier.

  • (2) The unobstructed area shall be

    • (a) free of any structure, equipment or other obstruction that could be used to penetrate or surmount the barrier or to restrict observation of the unobstructed area; and

    • (b) continuously and uniformly illuminated at an intensity sufficient to permit clear observation of any person within the unobstructed area.

  • (3) Paragraph (2)(a) does not apply to structures in place on the day on which section 9.1 of these Regulations comes into force provided that appropriate physical protection measures are taken to maintain the integrity of the barrier described in section 9.

  • SOR/2006-191, ss. 13, 40(F)
  • SOR/2010-108, s. 12(E)

Protected Area Intrusion Detection

 Every protected area shall be

  • (a) equipped with devices that

    • (i) employ two independent systems that detect intrusion into the protected area,

    • (ii) detect any tampering that may cause any of the devices referred to in subparagraph (i) or (iv) to malfunction or cease to function,

    • (iii) when an event referred to in subparagraph (i) or (ii) is detected, set off a continuous alarm signal that is both audible and visible in a security monitoring room and that can be stopped only by a nuclear security officer, and

    • (iv) facilitate an immediate assessment of the cause of the alarm; or

  • (b) kept under the direct visual surveillance of a nuclear security officer who is equipped with a device that can set off a continuous alarm signal that

    • (i) is both audible and visible in a security monitoring room, and

    • (ii) can be stopped only by a nuclear security officer from the security monitoring room.

  • SOR/2006-191, ss. 14, 39

Location of Inner Area

 Every inner area shall be located within a protected area.

Structure or Barrier Enclosing Inner Area

[
  • SOR/2006-191, s. 40(F)
]
  •  (1) Every inner area shall be totally enclosed by a structure or barrier that is designed and constructed to prevent, alone or in combination with other structures or barriers, persons from completing both of the following actions before an on-site nuclear response force can make an effective intervention:

    • (a) gaining unauthorized access to Category I nuclear material by using hand-held tools, weapons or explosive substances; and

    • (b) removing the nuclear material from the inner area.

  • (2) The structure or barrier that encloses an inner area shall be located at least 5 m away from every point of the barrier that encloses the protected area.

  • (3) Each gate, door, window or other means of entry or exit in the structure or barrier that encloses an inner area shall be kept closed and locked with a device that, from outside the structure or barrier, can only be unlocked by two persons authorized under section 18, using two different keys or combinations at the same time.

  • (4) No person authorized to enter an inner area under section 18 shall enter that area unless at least one other person authorized to enter the area enters and remains in the area at the same time.

  • (5) No licensee shall permit a land vehicle to enter an inner area except when there is an operational requirement for it to be there.

  • SOR/2006-191, s. 15

Inner Area Intrusion Detection

 Every inner area shall be

  • (a) equipped with devices that

    • (i) employ two independent systems that detect intrusion into, and unauthorized movement within and out of, the inner area,

    • (ii) detect any tampering that may cause any of the devices referred to in subparagraph (i) or (iv) to malfunction or cease to function,

    • (iii) when an event referred to in subparagraph (i) or (ii) is detected, set off two independent continuous alarm signals each of which is both audible and visible, one in the security monitoring room that can be stopped only from that room by a nuclear security officer, and the other in at least one other attended place outside the inner area that can be stopped only from that place by a person who is authorized to enter the inner area under section 18, and

    • (iv) facilitate an immediate assessment of the cause of an alarm; or

  • (b) kept under the direct visual surveillance of a nuclear security officer who is equipped with a device that can set off a continuous alarm signal that

    • (i) is both audible and visible in a security monitoring room and in at least one other attended place outside the inner area, and

    • (ii) can be stopped only by a nuclear security officer from the security monitoring room or by a person who is authorized to enter the inner area in accordance with section 18 from another attended place outside the inner area.

  • SOR/2006-191, ss. 16, 39

Vital Areas

 Every licensee shall identify all vital areas and implement physical protection measures — including access control and measures designed to delay unauthorized access — taking into account the design basis threat and any other credible threat identified by a threat and risk assessment.

  • SOR/2006-191, s. 17

Security Monitoring Room

  •  (1) Every licensee shall monitor from a security monitoring room, access to which is controlled by the licensee, the following:

    • (a) the protected area devices referred to in subparagraphs 11(a)(i) to (iv);

    • (b) the inner area devices referred to in subparagraphs 14(a)(i) to (iv); and

    • (c) those physical protection measures, implemented in accordance with section 14.1, that consist of devices that

      • (i) detect intrusion,

      • (ii) detect any tampering that may cause a device referred to in subparagraph (i) or (iv) to malfunction or cease to function,

      • (iii) set off an alarm when an event referred to in subparagraph (i) or (ii) is detected, and

      • (iv) facilitate the immediate assessment of the cause of the alarm.

  • (2) The security monitoring room shall be

    • (a) located outside any inner area;

    • (b) designed, constructed and situated so as to reduce vulnerability to damage and to resist forced entry by the use of hand-held tools, weapons, explosive substances or land vehicles until the on-site nuclear response force can make an effective intervention;

    • (c) equipped with

      • (i) a two-way radio that can be used to communicate with both the on-site nuclear response force and the off-site response force,

      • (ii) a device that can be used at any time to alert the off-site response force,

      • (iii) a telephone, and

      • (iv) equipment that permits direct communication with each nuclear security officer who is stationed outside the security monitoring room;

    • (d) located and equipped so as to enable a nuclear security officer inside the security monitoring room to receive and acknowledge the audible and visible alarm signals referred to in subparagraph 11(a)(iii), paragraph 11(b), subparagraph 14(a)(iii) and paragraph 14(b); and

    • (e) attended at all times by at least one nuclear security officer.

  • (3) A licensee shall monitor the alarm devices referred to in subparagraphs (1)(c)(iii), 11(a)(iii) and 14(a)(iii) using a primary alarm monitoring system and a backup system. The backup system shall maintain the operation of the alarm monitoring function, including key computer systems, in the event of a failure of equipment essential to the functioning of the primary system.

  • SOR/2006-191, ss. 18, 39

Uninterrupted Power Supply

 A physical protection system shall include a physical protection measure that, in the event of the loss of power, maintains an uninterrupted power supply for a period sufficient to allow for an alternate continuous power supply to be implemented for

  • (a) all devices required by this Part related to intrusion detection and the immediate assessment of the cause of an alarm, other than lighting as required by paragraph 10(2)(b); and

  • (b) the devices referred to in paragraph 15(2)(c).

  • SOR/2006-191, s. 19
  • SOR/2010-108, s. 13(F)

Key Control

  •  (1) Every licensee shall maintain records of all devices, including keys and locks, whether electronic or manual, used to control access to protected, inner or vital areas or to Category I, II or III nuclear material.

  • (2) The records shall list all devices and their combinations, if any, that have been issued, the date of issue and the individuals to whom they were issued.

  • (3) If there are reasonable grounds to believe that any device or combination is defective or has been lost, stolen or unlawfully transferred or has otherwise become insecure, as the case may be, the licensee shall immediately take all measures necessary to restore the integrity of the device or combination believed to be affected.

  • (4) A licensee shall not issue a device or combination controlling access to a protected, inner or vital area or to Category I, II or III nuclear material to any person unless an authorization referred to in subsection 17(1) or 18(1), (2) or (3), as the case may be, has been issued to them and they are required to access that area in the performance of their duties.

  • SOR/2006-191, s. 19

Site Plan

 Every licensee shall maintain a site plan that indicates the location and includes a description of the following, if applicable:

  • (a) the perimeter of the lands on which a high-security site is located;

  • (b) the barrier enclosing every protected area;

  • (c) the protected areas;

  • (d) the unobstructed areas that meet the requirements set out in section 10;

  • (e) the structure or barrier enclosing every inner area;

  • (f) the inner areas; and

  • (g) the vital areas.

  • SOR/2006-191, ss. 20, 40(F)
 
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